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they can delimit the warranty obligations. Second, because restrictive
covenants that run with the land cannot be altered by subsequent
buyers5 absent court assistance,"1 it is only equitable that the original
grantor who imposed the restriction be held liable.
Although the Hinson decision has left many important questions
unanswered and therefore has undermined the efforts of the court to
achieve stability in the land market, nevertheless, the problems are not
insurmountable and future decisions along the lines suggested can
achieve the desired objectives of the court. However, the North Carolina Supreme Court's novel decision in Hinson v. Jefferson does reflect an
increasing willingness on behalf of the court to use implied warranties to
protect purchasers of real property. Moreover, the decision may foreshadow future expansion of the implied warranty doctrine to other
areas, such as landlord tenant relations.
IRA

J. BOTVINICK

Security Interests-Garagemen's Liens and Duress of Goods
The doctrine that an artisan who enhances the value of a chattel
at the request of its owner has a lien on that chattel for his reasonable
charges is deeply rooted in the common law.' Equally venerable is
the concept of duress of goods, a rule that protects an individual who
finds himself coerced in some fashion through the wrongful seizure or
detention of his property.' These two principles are similar in that
each finds its application in a bailment of goods situation. 3 In Adder
v. Holman & Moody, Inc.,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court was presented with a question that involved an interplay between the two
concepts: whether duress of goods was perpetrated when a garageman
insisted that an owner-bailor sign a document purporting to waive all
defenses based on poor workmanship before the garageman relinquished an automobile on which he had made repairs. The court, in
56. Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N.C. 426, 431, 20 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1942).
57. E.g., Muilenburg v. Blevins, 262 N.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 493 (1955).
1. R. BRowN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 13.1, at 394-95 (3d ed. 1975);
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS iN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 33.2, at 873 (1965).

2. This concept had its origin in the early eighteenth century. See note 23 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 23-35 infra.
4. 288 N.C. 484, 219 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
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finding no duress of goods, determined that the garageman had a valid
lien on the car for the amount owing for services rendered. The court
then held that although the owner-bailor had waived certain defenses
by signing the document, he could still bring an affirmative suit.5
Adder was an action to recover damages for injuries allegedly
resulting from defendant's negligence and breach of implied warranty
in rebuilding plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff James B. Adder entered
into a contract with defendant that provided that defendant would
convert plaintiff's 1971 Maverick automobile into a vehicle suitable for
use on a drag strip or race track. By the time of the completion of
the work, plaintiff had paid defendant approximately 10,000 dollars.
Of this sum, twenty-five hundred dollars was borrowed from a bank
by plaintiff, and defendant co-signed the bank note. Upon delivery of
the automobile, defendant received plaintiff's personal check for
$1538.03, the balance due on the contract. The check, however, was
not honored due to insufficient funds. Several weeks later, as plaintiff
was warming up the car for a race, the engine "blew." Plaintiff returned the automobile to defendant and requested that defendant
determine the trouble.
A few weeks after the incident, plaintiff asked defendant for the
automobile but was told that it would not be released until plaintiff
tendered the amount due on the contract and also paid the bank note
endorsed by defendant. After telephone negotiations between the
parties' attorneys, plaintiff went to defendant's place of business with
a certified check to pay the note. Defendant, however, refused to
return the car unless provisions were made regarding the balance due;
plaintiff subsequently agreed to pay the balance in several weeks.
Defendant then telephoned its lawyer, who dictated a promissory note6
7
and a second instrument referred to by the parties as a "release,"
which attempted to limit entirely defendant's liability. 8 Plaintiff signed
5. This latter finding was the subject of a dissenting opinion. See text accompanying notes 47-53 infra.
6. The text of this note is found in 288 N.C. at 487-88, 219 S.E.2d at 193.
7. Id. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
8. The text of the instrument is as follows:
This will acknowledge my indebtedness of $1538.03 representing the balance due for labor and parts to finish my drag race car and that I have no
defenses or set-offs against such indebtedness grounded upon poor workmanship or other objections.
In consideration for an extension of time until August 10, 19-72, I agree
to execute and deliver to you my promissory note in the amount of $1538.03
and further agree that should I fail to pay by August 10, 1972, and you are
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both documents and later testified that he had read and understood the

writings before signing them and that he did not contact his attorney
because the latter was in court at the time.'
The trial judge, at the close of testimony, ruled that the "release"
was binding and dismissed plaintiff's action. 0 The court of appeals

reversed the dismissal, 1 holding that plaintiff had been the victim of
a scheme of duress designed to exact a release that would free defendant from liability. The supreme court similarly refused to dismiss the
complaint, 2 but on different grounds. The court found the elements
necessary for duress of goods to be absent because defendant's garageman's lien, which the court of appeals had thought to be extinguished,
was still in existence. 3 The court, however, found the instrument's
waiver provisions ambiguous, construed the "release" against the de-

fendant-drafter, and concluded that plaintiffs affirmative suit for negligence and breach of warranty was not barred.' 4
Duress of goods is but one component of the larger doctrine of
economic duress.' 5 "Duress is a form of coercion. . . . [which] usually

involves the transfer of money or property as a result of that coercion."' 6

Although its limits are not clear,'" the doctrine may be

employed, for example, by the coerced party in a suit to void a transfer
or a contract,' 8 or it may furnish an affirmative defense in a suit brought
to enforce a transaction.' 9 Duress is related to and sometimes confused
required to turn this note over to an attorney for collection, I will pay reasonably [sic] attorney fees.
I further agree that in the event that you should undertake suit against
me on the note, I will not plead any defenses against payment of same.
Signed: JAMES B. ADDER
Id. at 487, 219 S.E.2d at 193.
9. Id. at 486, 219 S.E.2d at 192.
10. Id. at 488, 219 S.E.2d at 193. Judgment was also entered on defendant's
counterclaim, plaintiff being required to pay defendant the amount due on the contract
plus interest. Id. at 489, 219 S.E.2d at 194.
11. 25 N.C. App. 588, 214 S.E.2d 227 (1975).
12. 288 N.C. 484, 219 S.E.2d (1975) (two justices dissented).
13. Id. at 491-92, 219 S.E.2d at 195; see text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
14. Id. at 493, 219 S.E.2d at 196; see text accompanying notes 47-53 infra.
15. See Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure,20 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1942).
16. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.2, at 655 (1973); see
Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 191, 179 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1971).
17. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MiCH. L. Rnv.
253, 288-89 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971).
19. See, e.g., People ex rel. Carpentier v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 17 I11.
2d
214, 161 N.E.2d 318 (1959); Gallagher Switchboard Corp. v. Heckler Elec. Co., 34
Misc. 2d 256, 229 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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with the doctrines of fraud and undue influence. The victim of duress

is fully aware that he is being coerced to act contrary to his will. The
victim of fraud, however, does not know that he is the object of wrong-

ful action, for "[firaud rests upon deception by misrepresentation or
concealment.

' 20

The distinguishing feature of undue influence is the

fiduciary relationship of the parties, with one party trusting and relying
on the judgment of the other. Undue influence is exerted when the
dominant party uses his position of trust to affect the judgment of the
dependent party, who, like the fraud victim, is unaware of any wrong-

doing.2 ' Undue influence may therefore exist when the conduct falls
22
short of duress.
"Duress of goods" is the label applied when economic duress is
attempted or accomplished through the seizure or detention of another's personal property."3 In order to establish duress of goods
under North Carolina law, it must be shown that (1) the person who
has seized or detained the property has done so wrongfully, and (2)
the owner of the property has been compelled to act in a way that operated to deprive him of "free will."''z The courts, in determining the
existence of duress of goods, will look beyond the form of the transac-

tion to all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 5
Duress of goods will not be found by the North Carolina courts
when personal property is withheld from its owner by means of a valid

lien, because the requirement of wrongful seizure or detention is not
met.2 Such is the case when the possessor is a garageman or other artisan with a lien 27 on the property. At common law a garageman has "a
20. 278 N.C. at 191, 179 S.E.2d at 703.
21. Edwards v. Bowden, 107 N.C. 58, 62-63, 12 S.E. 58, 59 (1890).
22. 278 N.C. at 191, 179 S.E.2d at 703.
23. Originally at common law, relief was restricted to those situations in which
duress took the form of physical violence, imprisonment, or threats of such action. See
Dawson, supra note 17, at 254. In the early eighteenth century it was recognized that
economic pressure as well could constitute duress, and the first such pressure acknowledged as duress was the wrongful detention of another's property, which was termed
"duress of goods." See Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B.
1732).
24. Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 31, 140 S.E.2d 714, 718 (1965); Smithwick v.
Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 371, 67 S.E. 913, 914 (1910). The concept of "free will" has
long been criticized as being of little analytical value. See, e.g., Dalzell, supra note 15,
at 238-40; Dawson, supra note 17, at 266-67.
25. See Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N.C. 369, 67 S.F. 913 (1910).
26. See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
27. It is necessary to distinguish artisans' liens--of which the garagemen's lien is
one type-from "mechanics' liens." The latter term is more commonly employed to re-
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possessory interest in a vehicle left in his care by the owner or legal
possessor and in which he has invested labor and materials. ' 28 North
Carolina General Statutes section 44A-2(d) codified this common law
lien. 29 The power of a garageman to enforce his lien by sale of the
motor vehicle, a right unavailable at common law, 30 is granted by North
Carolina General Statutes section 44A-4. s1 Possession of the motor
vehicle is essential to the lien, 32 and two rules relating to possession
that had long been part of the case law are now statutory:38 (1) the
fer to security interests in real property, the word "mechanic" being used in its older
sense to mean "laborer." See R. BROWN, supra note 1, § 13.1, at 393. Liens on real
property are governed by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-7 to -24 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
28. Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 648 (M.D.N.C. 1975). Artisans' liens in
North Carolina also have a constitutional basis. N.C. CoNST. art. X, § 3 instructs the
General Assembly to "provide by proper legislation for giving to mechanics and laborers
an adequate lien on the subject-matter of their labor." Provisions for liens on personal
property are contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-1 to -6 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Any person who repairs, services, tows, or stores motor vehicles in the ordinary course of his business pursuant to an express or implied contract with
an owner or legal possessor of the motor vehicle has a lien upon the motor
vehicle for reasonable charges for such repairs, servicing, towing, or storing.
This lien shall have priority over perfected and unperfected security interests.
30. 1 L. JONES, THE LAw OF LIENS §§ 11, 1033, 1038 (3d ed. 1914).
31. The original provisions of section 44A-4 enabled sale of the property to

be accomplished without affording the owner the opportunity for notice and a hearing to determine judicially the validity of the underlying debt. These provisions
were held to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because "actual
[permanent] dispossession" of the personalty was possible without notice or hearing.
Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975). The Caesardecision is primarily
based on Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969), which "make it clear that due process requires notice and a prior
hearing before property may be taken from a debtor." 387 F. Supp. at 649. The statute
was amended to comply with the Caesar ruling. Act of May 29, 1975, ch. 438, § 1,
[1975] N.C. Sess. Laws 436-39.
The statutes that provide for the existence of artisans' liens, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
44A-2 & -3 (Cum. Supp. 1975), survived that same due process attack in Caesar. The
district court termed the lien "a balancing of the interests between ownership rights and
the right of a craftsman to have security for payment for his service," and held, on the
basis of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), that "interim retention" of
the property without fulfilling notice and hearing requirements was not unconstitutional.
387 F. Supp. at 648, 649.
32. See Barbre-Askew Fin., Inc. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d 381
(1957).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
When lien arises and terminates.-Liens conferred under this article
arise only when the lienor acquires possession of the property and terminate
and become unenforceable when the lienor voluntarily relinquishes the possession of the property upon which a lien might be claimed, or when an owner,
his agent, a legal possessor or any other person having a security or other interest in the property tenders prior to sale the amount secured by the lien plus
reasonable storage, boarding and other expenses incurred by the lienor. The
reacquisition of possession of property voluntarily relinquished shall not reinstate the lien.
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lienor loses his possessory lien if he voluntarily surrenders possession
of the property to the bailor,3 4 and (2) once the lien is lost by voluntary surrender of possession, it cannot be reinstated by subsequent
reacquisition.3 5
Thus, the issue of possession was crucial to the validity of the lien
in Adder. The court of appeals found the defendant's refusal to return
the car "wrongful" because its lien had been terminated by the previous

surrender of the car.16 Although seeming to comport with the statutes
concerning possessory liens, the court of appeals committed a glaring
error, for it ignored precedent nearly a half-century old which defined

voluntary surrender of possession.

In Reich v. Triplett,37 a situation

almost identical to the one in Adder, a check was tendered to a garageman for the full amount owed for repairs on an automobile and the
vehicle was surrendered but the check was returned for insufficient
funds. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the garageman's

lien still existed, for in those circumstances possession was not surrendered "voluntarily and unconditionally" as required. 8

In Adder the

supreme court correctly applied Reich, held the lien to be valid, and
thus found absent an essential element of duress of goods: wrongful

possession of the property.3
This analysis by the supreme court was all that was necessary to
find that plaintiff's signing of the "release" was a "voluntary adjustment

of a dispute" and not duress of goods.4"

Unfortunately, the court con-

34. See, e.g., Barbre-Askew Fin., Inc. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d 381
(1957); Tedder v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 124 N.C. 342, 32 S.E. 714 (1899); Block v.
Dowd, 120 N.C. 402, 27 S.E. 129 (1897).
35. See, e.g., Barbre-Askew Finance, Inc. v. Thompson, 247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d
381 (1957); Block v. Dowd, 120 N.C. 402, 27 S.E. 129 (1897).
It is possible for a garageman to deliver the motor vehicle to its owner under an
agreement that preserves the lien. However, such a preserved lien is one created by contract and does not arise by operation of law. See Barbre-Askew Fin., Inc. v. Thompson,
247 N.C. at 148, 100 S.E.2d at 385. A contractual lienholder does not have the statutory assurance that his lien will have priority over perfected and unperfected security
interests. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (set forth in note 29 supra);
see Lee, Liens on PersonalProperty Not Governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
44 N.C.L. Rnv. 322, 330-31 (1966).
36. 25 N.C. App. at 591, 214 S.E.2d at 229.
37. 199 N.C. 678, 155 S.E. 573 (1930). The court of appeals correctly cited
Reich for the proposition that "[plossession is necessary to the existence of the lien."
25 N.C. App. at 591, 214 S.E.2d at 229.
38. 199 N.C. at 682, 155 S.E. at 575. The court relied on Maxton Auto Co. v.
Rudd, 176 N.C. 497, 97 S.E. 477 (1918), in which payment was stopped on a check
tendered to a garageman and the court used an estoppel theory to reinstate the lien. Id.
at 499, 97 S.E. at 478.
39. 288 N.C. at 491-92, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
40. Id. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
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fused the problem by engaging in an unnecessary discussion of whether

the parties were "on equal footing." 41 The relationship of the parties,
particularly if it is a fiduciary one, is probative of the issue of whether
the second element of duress of goods-the deprivation of the victim's
"free will"-is present. 2 Even if the parties had been found to be
on unequal footing, and they were not,4" the absence of the element

of wrongful possession alone would mean that there could be no
duress of goods. The court seemed to say that, even if there is rightful
possession by the bailee, a showing that he took advantage of an
44

unequal relationship would support a finding of duress of goods.
Such a view is at odds with the court's affirmance of the two necessary
elements of duress of goods (wrongful possession and subversion of
"free will") 45 and is clearly incorrect. A finding of wrongdoing based

solely on the abuse of an unequal relationship or of a position of trust
is not duress of goods but rather undue influence."
Although duress of goods was found not to be present, the court's

final disposition of the case turned on an interpretation of the "release"
signed by plaintiff. 47 The court found certain language to be ambiguous and construed it against the defendant-drafter. This language in
the release acknowledged plaintiff's indebtedness and further stated
that plaintiff had "no defenses or set-offs against such indebtedness

grounded upon poor workmanship or other objections."'48 The court
held that the writing only limited plaintiff's defenses or set-offs in the

event defendant sued plaintiff for the amount due on the note that
plaintiff contemporaneously executed and had no effect on plaintiffs
claims based on negligence or implied warranty. 49 The serious diffi41. Id. at 491, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
42. Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942); Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1967); Ingram v. Lewis,
37 F.2d 259, 263-64 (10th Cir. 1930); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 711 (1931).
43. 288 N.C. at 491, 219 S.E.2d at 195. The court placed great emphasis on the
fact that plaintiff had counsel but chose to act without seeking his advice. Some courts
have ruled that there can be no duress if the victim had an opportunity to consult with
an attorney. See, e.g., Alloy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 302 F.2d 528, 530-31 (Ct.
CI. 1962); Smith v. Lenchner, 204 Pa. Super. 500, 504, 205 A.2d 626, 628 (1964);
Oremus v. Wynhoff, 20 Wis. 2d 635, 641, 123 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1963).
44. 288 N.C. at 491-92, 219 S.E.2d at 195.
45. Id. at 490, 219 S.E.2d at 194; see text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. See generally D. DonBs, supra note
16, § 10.3, at 672-74.
47. See note 8 supra for the text of this instrument.
48. 288 N.C. at 492, 219 S.E.2d at 196.
49. Id. at 493, 219 S.E.2d at 196.
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culty presented by this holding was the basis of the dissent,5 0 which
found such a reading of the document to be "impermissible and totally
illogical." 51
The final result in Adder is not sound for the reason cited in the
dissent: those defenses determined by the court to have been waived
by plaintiff are the very subjects of his affirmative suit, an action that
the court permitted to be brought.5 2 Had defendant brought suit first,
the negligence and warranty claims, since they arose out of the same
53
transaction, would have been compulsory set-offs and counterclaims.
As such they would have been disallowed by the language in the instrument as interpreted by the court. The court has thus imparted a
schizophrenic quality to the negligence and warranty claims, a trait that
is wholly devoid of any logical basis.
Both the supreme court and the court of appeals had the protection of the consumer in mind in their treatments of the case. The
difference between the opinions is in the tools chosen to achieve that
aim. The court of appeals reached the desired result through an application of the duress of goods doctrine, while the higher court, in a
slightly more sophisticated fashion, employed contract interpretation.
The reasoning of each court, however, is equally incorrect. Plaintiff
Adder, although forced to scratch at the drag strip, won the supreme
court-sponsored race to the courthouse and the spoils of victory were
his warranty and negligence claims.
CHARLES

50.
joined.
51.
52.
53.

B.

WAYNE

Chief Justice Sharp wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Copeland
Id.
Id. at 495, 219 S.E.2d at 198.
Id.
Id. at 495, 219 S.E.2d at 197. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:
Compulsory Counterclaims.-A pleading shall state as a counterclaim

any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if
(1) At the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of
another pending action, or
(2) The opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render
a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any
counterclaim under this rule.

